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ABSTRACT
We propose a novel data collection and data sharing model for
cloud-IoT architectures with an emphasis on data privacy. This
model has been implemented in Privasee, an open source platform
for privacy-aware web-application development, which provides a
plug-in module to support IoT application development. Privasee
uses a cloud-IoT architecture called DataBank.We provide examples
and discuss future extensions.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Formal security models; Access
control; Privacy-preserving protocols; Logic and verification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web services and Internet of Things (IoT) applications pose threats
to personal privacy due to the large volume of data obtained from
users. To comply with current regulations (e.g., GDPR in the EU, or
the recommendations of the FTC in the US) that give users control
over their data, a number of privacy-preserving architectures have
been proposed for cloud-IoT applications. The distinctive character-
istic of these platforms is that data privacy is a core feature, follow-
ing the "privacy-by-design" paradigm. For example, Databox [15]
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automatically collects data from IoT devices and stores the data in
local hubs. Rather than using a central cloud repository, all data
processes and access control are executed locally in the box, under
the control of the data owner. An alternative solution is to use a
centralised cloud platform to store user’s data, such as the Personal
Data Vault (PDV) proposed by Mun et al. [17], where users have
individual secured repositories. Access control lists, trace-audit and
rule recommender are used to manage data policies; however, PDV
does not include functionalities for users to select and pre-process
the data emanating from IoT devices before storage.
DataBank [12] is a hybrid solution: it provides both a local stor-
age (Data Pocket) as well as a central cloud repository, in contrast
with Databox and PDV, and it allows users to control data collection
from IoT devices and web applications as well as controlling data
access. The collected data is filtered in a local hub and transmitted to
the central repository according to a user specified data collection
policy (collection control). DataBank also controls which services
can access the data, using an access control policy.
In this paper we propose an integrated data collection and access
control model for hybrid architectures such as DataBank. Specif-
ically, we describe techniques to specify policies to control data
collection and data sharing and to implement the local and central
repositories. The Data Pocket is a distinctive feature of DataBank,
and it is also a critical component as private data stored in this
repository needs to be kept secure and accessible. We discuss alter-
native solutions for the implementation of the Data Pocket, either
as local storage under the responsibility of the user, or as a separate
cloud storage in the DataBank. The first alternative is suitable for
users that have the resources to manage their local storage, while
the second is a practical solution for non-technical users. These
techniques have been implemented in Privasee, a cloud-IoT de-
velopment platform based on the DataBank architecture. Privasee
offers data owners a secure way to store data, an interface to specify
which data they want to upload and how they want to share it, and
mechanisms to enforce users’ privacy preferences.
Summarising, this paper makes the following contributions to
ensure end-to-end privacy preservation (from data collection to
access control) in cloud-IoT architectures:
• We propose a data access model that combines data collection and
access control features, with a graph-based language to specify
policies covering the whole data life cycle. The graph representa-
tion of policies facilitates policy visualisation and analysis. We
demonstrate how queries can be evaluated using policy graphs,
and how policy properties can be checked.
• We describe techniques to implement the data pocket (local store)
as well as the central repository in the cloud using an encryption
mechanism that ensures that only the data owner and no one
else (not even Privasee itself), is able to retrieve private data.
Alternatively, users could implement the data pocket locally and
upload filtered data to the cloud.
• We provide a proof of concept implementation of the proposed
architecture and data access model: Privasee.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminary
notions on cloud-IoT architectures and privacy. Section 3 presents
the data access model and a graph representation of policies, used
to analyse policies in Section 4. Section 5 discusses implementa-
tion techniques. Related works and conclusion are summarised in
Section 6 and 7, respectively.
2 BACKGROUND
We recall the main privacy-related notions that will be needed in
the rest of the paper.
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Cloud-IoT
Architectures
Most web-based and mobile applications collect private data in or-
der to provide better services to users. However, there is a tension
between the benefit that sharing personal data can bring to the user
and the privacy consequences of unrestricted data collection. Cur-
rent regulations give users the right to control the data collected by
third parties, however, there is no general solution to the technical
challenges in building services that enable individuals to share data
while retaining control over what is shared and when. Privacy leaks
can occur despite anonymisation [22]. Privacy-aware mechanisms
such as differential privacy [10], encryption and anonymisation are
useful but not sufficient on their own [9].
Recently, several cloud-IoT platforms have been proposed to
help application developers design privacy-aware services. Typi-
cal cloud-IoT architectures consist of three layers: an object layer
(with hardware and software components to manage IoT devices),
a middle layer to deal with the cloud storage and management
of data, and an application (or services) layer. The object and ap-
plication layers have a standard set of features in all cloud-IoT
architectures, but there is great variety in the definition of the mid-
dle layer (number of sub-layers and proposed technologies). The
middle layers are in charge of the transfer between the objects in
the layer below and the applications in the upper layer, as well as
aggregating data and storing it in cloud databases, logging events
for auditing purposes, performing data analysis, connecting vari-
ous data sources, etc. For more details and examples of cloud-IoT
architectures, see [1, 2, 8, 13, 20, 23].
Our chosen cloud-IoT architecture, DataBank [12], has four lay-
ers as shown in Fig. 1: application layer (which contains interfaces
to allow users and services to interact with the DataBank), cloud
layer (which manages storage and controls data access; it includes
an access control enforcement module, cloud storage, auditing log,
privacy-utility mechanism to recommend services to users accord-
ing to their privacy preferences, and privacy policy), data pocket
layer (a local hub of data from IoT devices; it has a memory and
micro processing capabilities, to perform light-weight data pro-
cessing before submitting to the cloud storage, and includes virtual
objects representing IoT devices, a module to enforce data collection
policies and communication control unit to control the commu-
nication amongst virtual objects), and physical objects layer (or
sensors layer), which contains IoT devices which communicate with
DataBank through drivers and connect via standard protocols.
The distinctive feature of this architecture is that only data that
users want to share is stored in the central repository. Applica-
tions communicate with DataBank to access stored data, which is
managed in accordance with the policies.
Figure 1: DataBank Architecture
2.2 Category-Based Policies
A variety of access control models and data collection models have
been defined, focusing either on the way data collected should be
filtered, or the way it should be shared with third parties, see Fig-
ure 2. The category-based model [4, 6] is an axiomatic model that
has been shown to subsume most of the existing models, and whose
formal semantics permits reasoning about policy properties. We
recall below the general principles of category-based access con-
trol and category-based data collection. Based on these principles,
we will define a data access model for cloud-IoT architectures in
Section 3.
2.2.1 Category-Based Access Control - CBAC. The CBAC model
consists of a set of entities, relationships and axioms (see [6] for
more details and examples of category-based access control).
Entities: A countable set C of categories, denoted c0, c1, . . . ; a
countable set P of principals, denoted p0, p1, . . . ; a countable set
A of actions, denoted a0, a1, . . . ; a countable set R of resources,
denoted r0, r1, . . . ; a finite set Auth of possible answers to access
requests (e.g., {grant, deny, undetermined}) and a countable set S
of situational identifiers to denote environmental information.
Figure 2: Data Collection and Access Control
Relationships:
• Principal-category assignment: PCA ⊆ P × C, such that (p, c) ∈
PCA iff the principal p ∈ P is assigned to the category c ∈ C.
• Resource-category assignment: RCA ⊆ R × C, such that (r , c) ∈
RCA iff the resource r ∈ R is assigned to the category c ∈ C.
• Permission-category assignment: ARCA ⊆ A × C × C, such
that (a, cr , cp ) ∈ ARCA iff action a ∈ A on resource category
cr ∈ C can be performed by the principals in the category cp ∈ C.
• Authorisations: PAR ⊆ P × A × R, such that (p,a, r ) ∈ PAR
iff the principal p ∈ P can perform the action a ∈ A on the
resource r ∈ R.
CBAC relationships must satisfy the following axiom, where c ⊆
c ′ denotes a hierarchical relation between categories (for example
set inclusion or simply equality). A closed-world assumption can
be used to derive prohibitions (any action that is not authorised
by the policy is forbidden) or additional prohibition relations and
axioms can be added (see [6] for more details).
(a1) ∀p ∈ P, ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ R, (∃cp , c ′p , cr , c ′r ∈ C,
(p, cp ) ∈ PCA, (r , cr ) ∈ RCA ∧ cr ⊆ c ′r , cp ⊆ c ′p
∧(a, c ′r , c ′p ) ∈ ARCA) ⇔ (p,a, r ) ∈ PAR
2.2.2 Category-Based Data Collection - CBDC. Data collection
policies specify which data from user devices should be stored.
CBDC policies are specified using entities and relationships as
described below (we refer to [13] for more details and examples).
Entities: A countable set D of IoT devices, denoted d1,d2, . . .;
a countable setDI of data items, denoted di1,di2, . . . ; a countable
set C of categories, denoted c0, c1, . . . ; a countable setA of actions,
denoted a1,a2, . . . ; a countable set S of services, denoted s1, s2, . . ..
Relationships: The following relationships are used to define
the authorised actions (additional relations can be included to spec-
ify prohibitions).
• Device Data-ItemAssignment:DDIA ⊆ D×DI, such that (d,di) ∈
DDIA iff the data item di is generated by the device d . Normally,
each data item is associated with one device only.
• Device-Data Item Category Assignment: DDICA ⊆ D × DI × C,
such that (d,di, c) ∈ DDICA iff the data item di ∈ DI generated
by the device d is assigned to the category c .
• Action-Service Category Assignment:ASCA ⊆ A×S×C, such that
(a, s, c) ∈ ASCA iff action a ∈ A of service s can be performed
on data items assigned to the category c .
• Authorisations: ASDID ⊆ A×S×DI×D, such that (a, s,di,d) ∈
ASDID iff action a ∈ A of service s ∈ S is authorised on the data
item di generated by d ∈ D.
CBDC relations must satisfy the following axiom.
(dc1) ∀d ∈ D, ∀di ∈ DI, ∀a ∈ A, ∀s ∈ S, (∃c, c ′ ∈ C,
(d,di) ∈ DDIA ∧ (d,di, c) ∈ DDICA ∧ c ⊆ c ′ ∧ (a, s, c ′)
∈ ASCA) ⇔ (a, s,di,d) ∈ ASDID
3 PRIVACY POLICIES FOR CLOUD-IOT
ARCHITECTURE
To specify privacy policies for cloud-IoT architectures, we present a
category-based data access (CBDA)model, which combines features
of CBDC and CBAC (see Section 2).
3.1 The CBDA Model
Policies in the CBDAmodel are defined using the sets of entities and
relationships of CBDC and CBAC, and additionally, a set of data-
sharing categories DSC. These will be used to represent classes
of data stored in the central repository. A CBDA policy consists
of two parts: a specification of data collection constraints, which
indicates how the data collected should be categorised and stored
(this can be seen as a CBDC policy, using data-sharing categories
instead of services); and a specification of data sharing constraints
(this is a CBAC policy, where services are the principals requesting
access to data). Data sharing categories are the elements “gluing”
both parts of the policy. We now define formally the components
of the CBDA model.
Entities: The set of entities of the CBDA model include:
• A countable setD of sources of data, denotedd1,d2, . . .: these are
abstractions of data sources and channels; for example, individual
sensors, aggregators that combine data from several sensors,
clocks, etc.
• A countable set DI of data items, partitioned into two sets:
– DU : unprocessed raw data items, denoted ud1,ud2, . . . , these
represent data generated by sensors and contextual informa-
tion (location, time, speed, etc.)
– DS : stored data items, denoted sd1, sd2, . . . , these represent
processed data stored in the central repository, which could
be shared with services.
• A countable set S of services, denoted s1, s2, . . .: these represent
actual services that process the data.
• A countable set C of categories partitioned into three sets:
– CDU : categories of unprocessed data, denoted udc0, udc1, . . . ;
represent categories of data items generated by devices.
– CDS : data sharing categories, denoted dsc1,dsc2, . . . ; these
represent categories of data stored in the central repository.
– CS : service categories, denoted sc0, sc1, . . .
• A countable set A of actions, partitioned into two sets:
– AD : data collection actions, denoted da1,da2, . . . , are opera-
tions on unprocessed data that produce data items ready for
storage. We write (da,ud, sd) ∈ Opd if the data collection
action da produces sd from ud . Actions of interest in the con-
text of data collection may include upload, average, encrypt,
decrypt, etc.
– AS : service actions, denoted sa1, sa2, . . . , are operations on
shared data items stored in the repository, performed by ser-
vices. Actions of interest in the context of access control may
include view data, transfer, share file, etc.
Relationships: The following relations are used to derive the
authorised and prohibited actions for data collection and sharing.
• Device-Data Assignment: DUA ⊆ D × DU , such that (d,ud) ∈
DUA iff the unprocessed data ud ∈ DU is generated by the
data source d ∈ D. We assume each unprocessed data item is
associated with only one data source for simplicity.
• Data Item-Category Assignment: DICA ⊆ DI × C, which is
partitioned into DICAU and DICAS :
(ud,udc) ∈ DICAU iff the unprocessed data ud ∈ DU is in
the unprocessed data category udc ∈ CDU .
(sd,dsc) ∈ DICAS iff the stored data item sd ∈ DS is in the
data sharing category dsc ∈ CDS .• Action-Category Assignment: ACA ⊆ A × C × C, which is
partitioned into ACAD and ACAS :
(da,udc,dsc) ∈ ACAD iff data collection action da ∈ AD
can be performed on data items in the category udc ∈ CDU
to produce data in dsc ∈ CDS .(sa,dsc, sc) ∈ ACAS iff service action sa ∈ AS on data items in
data-sharing category dsc ∈ CDS can be performed by services
in category sc ∈ CS .
• Banned Action-Category Assignment: BACA ⊆ A × C × C,
which is again partitioned into BACAD and BACAS :
(da,udc,dsc) ∈ BACAD iff data collection action da ∈ AD
is banned for data items assigned to the category udc ∈ CDU
to produce data in dsc ∈ CDS (we write (da,udc,⊥) if da is
forbidden in udc for any dsc);
(sa,dsc, sc) ∈ BACAS iff service action sa ∈ AS on data items
in category dsc ∈ CDS is forbidden for services in category
sc ∈ CS .
• Service-Category Assignment: SCA ⊆ S × C, such that (s, sc) ∈
SCA iff the service s ∈ S is assigned to the service category
sc ∈ CS .
• Authorised Data Collection: AD ⊆ A × DU × DS such that
(da,ud, sd) ∈ AD iff the data collection action da ∈ AD is
authorised on unprocessed data ud ∈ DU to produce stored data
item sd ∈ DS .
• Prohibited Data Collection: BAD ⊆ A × DU × DS such that
(da,ud, sd) ∈ BAD iff the data collection action da ∈ AD is
forbidden on unprocessed data ud ∈ DU to produce stored data
item sd ∈ DS .
• Authorised Data Access:ADS ⊆ A×DS×S, such that (sa, sd, s) ∈
ADS iff service action sa ∈ AS is authorised on the stored data
item sd ∈ DS for the service s ∈ S.
• Prohibited Data Access: BADS ⊆ A × DS × S, such that
(sa, sd, s) ∈ BADS iff service action sa ∈ AS is banned on
the stored data item sd ∈ DS for the service s ∈ S.
• Additional relations UNDETD ⊆ A×DU ×DS and UNDETS ⊆
A ×DS × S contain the tuples (da,ud, sd) (resp. (sa, sd, s)) that
are neither authorised nor banned.
Axioms: The axioms specify the way data is collected and stored
(axiomsda1-da4), and theway it is accessed by services (axiomsda5-
da8). We assume the existence of a hierarchical relation between
categories, denoted c ⊆ c ′ (read c lower than c ′, i.e., less protected);
this can be for example set inclusion or simply equality. Authorised
actions are inherited by lower categories from higher categories
(axioms da1 and da5), whereas for prohibitions it is the reverse.
(da1) ∀ud ∈ DU , ∀sd ∈ DS , ∀da ∈ AD ,
(∃d ∈ D,∃udc,udc ′,dsc ∈ C, (d,ud) ∈ DUA∧
(ud,udc) ∈ DICAU ∧ udc ⊆ udc ′∧
(da,udc ′,dsc) ∈ ACAD ∧ (da,ud, sd) ∈ OPd∧
(sd,dsc) ∈ DICAS ) ⇔ (da,ud, sd) ∈ AD
(da2) ∀ud ∈ DU , ∀sd ∈ DS , ∀da ∈ AD ,
(∃d ∈ D,∃udc,udc ′,dsc ∈ C, (d,ud) ∈ DUA∧
(ud,udc) ∈ DICAU ∧ udc ′ ⊆ udc∧
(da,udc ′,dsc) ∈ BACAD ∧ (da,ud, sd) ∈ OPd∧
(sd,dsc) ∈ DICAS ) ⇔ (da,ud, sd) ∈ BAD
(da3) ∀ud ∈ DU , ∀sd ∈ DS , ∀da ∈ AD ,
(∃d ∈ D, (d,ud) ∈ DUA ∧ (da,ud, sd) ∈ OPd∧
(da,ud, sd) < AD ∧ (da,ud, sd) < BAD)
⇔ (da,ud, sd) ∈ UNDETD
(da4) AD ∩ BAD = ∅
(da5) ∀sd ∈ DS , ∀sa ∈ AS , ∀s ∈ S, (∃dsc,dsc ′, sc, sc ′ ∈ C,
(sd,dsc) ∈ DICAS ∧ dsc ⊆ dsc ′ ∧ (s, sc) ∈ SCA∧
sc ⊆ sc ′ ∧ (sa,dsc ′, sc ′) ∈ ACAS ) ⇔ (sa, sd, s) ∈ ADS
(da6) ∀sd ∈ DS , ∀sa ∈ AS , ∀s ∈ S, (∃dsc,dsc ′, sc, sc ′ ∈ C,
(sd,dsc) ∈ DICAS ∧ dsc ′ ⊆ dsc ∧ (s, sc) ∈ SCA ∧
sc ′ ⊆ sc ∧ (sa,dsc ′, sc ′) ∈ BACAS )
⇔ (sa, sd, s) ∈ BADS
(da7) ∀sd ∈ DS , ∀sa ∈ AS , ∀s ∈ S, ((sa, sd, s) < ADS ∧
(sa, sd, s) < BADS ⇔ (sa, sd, s) ∈ UNDETS )
(da8) ADS ∩ BADS = ∅
Definition 3.1. (CBDA policy) A category-based data access pol-
icy is a tuple ⟨E,Rel⟩ where
E = (D,DI,A,C,S, ⊆)
Rel = (DUA,DICA,SCA,ACA,BACA,AD,
BAD,ADS,BADS,UNDET )
such that axioms (da1)-(da8) are satisfied.
Axioms (da1)-(da8) can be used to prove properties of policies.
They are parametric on the policy relationships, which can be
defined by computational rules. A simpler model can be obtained
using only axioms (da1) and (da5) and a closed world assumption:
anything that is not explicitly authorised by (da1) and (da5) is
prohibited. Although this simpler model is less expressive, it can
be sufficient in many practical scenarios.
Below we describe a graph representation of policies, which we
use to control the data collection process and to evaluate data access
requests.
3.2 CBDA Policy Graph
Policy graphs [3, 11] are graphs where nodes represent policy enti-
ties and edges denote links between entities. Labels are attached to
nodes and edges, and store data (in the form of pairs attribute-value)
of relevance for the policy.
Definition 3.2 (Record). Let ai range over a finite set of attribute
names, and ti range over a finite set of values. A record R ∈ REC,
is a term of the form {a1 = t1, . . . ,an = tn } where each ai occurs
only once. We use the notation R.a for attribute selection, and the
notation update(R,a, t) to modify the value of attribute a in record
R to t ; if the attribute a does not exist in R, then the field a is added,
with value t .
In our representation of policies below, we assume all records
have an attribute ent with the name of the entity to which the
record belongs.
Example 3.3. The record containing information about the de-
vice Security Presence Detector could be specified as follows: R =
{ent = SecurityPresenceDetector, type = D, component = camera},
then R.ent = SecurityPresenceDetector, and update(R, function,
OutdoorMotionSensor) results in the new record {ent =
SecurityPresenceDetector, type = D, component = camera, function
= OutdoorMotionSensor}.
Definition 3.4 (Policy Graph). A CBDA policy graph is a tuple
G = (V ,E, lv, le), where V is a set of nodes, E is a set of undirected
edges, lv : V → REC is a labelling function for nodes, such that, for
every v ∈ V , lv(v).ent ∈ E (see Definition 3.1) and le : E → REC
is a labelling function for edges, such that, for every e ∈ E between
nodesv1 andv2, le(e).adj = {v1,v2}, wherev1,v2 ∈ V andv1 , v2.
Node labels contain a field type with values in
{D,DU ,DS , S,CDU ,CDS ,CS ,ACD ,ACS }
such that lv(v).type = D if lv(v).ent = d ∈ D (that is, D is the
type of the nodes representing data sources), and similarly DU
represents unprocessed data, DS represents stored data items,CDU ,
CDS , CS categories of unprocessed data, stored data and services
resp., S services, and ACD , A
C
S data collection and service actions
resp., where the super-index C denotes the set of categories to
which the action applies (in general, unless it is needed, we will
omit this index when referring to types of action nodes). We use the
type DI when we do not need to distinguish between unprocessed
and stored data (i.e., both DU and DS are represented by DI ), and
similarly we use the type A to represent both ACD and A
C
S and the
type C to represent CDU , CDS and CS . Nodes of type A include a
field Op in their label, which specifies the operation represented
by the action node.
The type of an edge is determined by the type of its adjacent
nodes, that is, type(e) = (lv(v1).type, lv(v2).type) if le(e).adj =
{v1,v2}.
Since we will represent edge-types (T1,T2) asT1T2 and the edges
are undirected, the types T1T2 and T2T1 then are not different.
Fig. 3 shows a path in a CBDA policy graph with nine entities
(nodes), starting with a node of type D (device) and ending with a
node of type S (service). An edge of type DDU connects a node of
type D with a node of type DU , an edge of type DUC connects a
node of type DU and a node of type C , etc.
Using types, we can classify nodes into four groups as depicted
in Figure 3: data source nodes (type D); data collection nodes, which
include nodes of type DU (unprocessed data), CDU (category of
unprocessed data), andACD (actions); access control nodes of type DS
(stored data),CDS (category of data item stored in the central cloud
repository), ACS (action on stored data) and CS (service category);
and data consumer nodes of type S (service) representing entities
that request access to data items.
A path of length n in a graph is a sequence v0,v1, . . . ,vn of
pairwise distinct nodes, such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, {vi−1,vi } =
le(e).adj, for some e ∈ E. In policy graphs, paths of specific types
define the authorised and prohibited actions for each kind of data
item and service, as shown below.
For edges of type CC , we introduce a target attribute to spec-
ify the hierarchical relation between adjacent categories. When
traversing an edge towards the target the category increases (in the
opposite direction it decreases).
We introduce the notions of constrained and constrained inverse
path, and then use these notions to define authorisation and prohi-
bition paths in CBDA policy graphs. In a constrained path, edges of
type CC are traversed towards the target, whereas in a constrained
inverse path these edges are traversed in the opposite direction.
This is formalised in Definitions 3.5 and 3.6.
Definition 3.5 (Paths in Policy Graphs). A constrained path be-
tween nodesv0,vn inG is a sequencev0, e1,v1, e2 . . . , en ,vn , where
all the nodes are different, such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, le(ei ).adj =
{vi−1,vi } and vi ∈ le(ei ).target if target exists in le(ei ).
A constrained inverse path between nodes v0,vn in G is a se-
quencev0, e1,v1, e2 . . . , en ,vn , such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, le(ei ).adj =
{vi−1,vi } and vi−1 ∈ le(ei ).target if target exists in le(ei ).
In a constrained path, categories are traversed from lower to
higher and from higher to lower in a constrained inverse path.
Definition 3.6. Let G be a policy graph and c1, c2 be two cate-
gories in C. We write c1 ⊆ c2 if there is a constrained path between
the nodes labelled by c1 and c2 where all the edges are of type (CC).
If c1 ⊆ c2 and c2 ⊆ c1 then the categories c1, c2 are equivalent and
we write c1 = c2.
The concept of a hierarchical relation ⊆ could be applied to other
entities such as actions or services.
Definition 3.7 (Types for paths). Letv0, . . . ,vn be a path of length
n, such that lv(vi ).type = Ti for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The type of the path is
the sequence given by the types of the edges along the path, that is
T0T1,T1T2, . . . ,Tn−1Tn .
The notation type(v0,v1, . . . ,vn ) = T0T1,T1T2, . . . ,Tn−1Tn will
be used to indicate that there is a path v0,v1, . . . ,vn and its edges
have types T0T1,T1T2, . . . ,Tn−1Tn .
Furthermore, if an edge e between nodes vi and vi+1 in a path
v0,v1, . . . ,vn has type CC , then we will denote its type as
−→
CC if
vi+1 ∈ le(e).target, and ←−CC if vi ∈ le(e).target (that is, type −→CC
means that the edge is traversed from a category ci to a category
ci+1 where ci ⊆ ci+1, that is, from a lower category to a higher
category, and type ←−CC means that the edge is traversed in the
opposite direction, from a higher category to a lower one).
Figure 3: Types of nodes in a CBDA graph
Figure 4: Authorisation Path in a CBDA Policy Graph
Figure 5: Prohibition Path in a CBDA Policy Graph
Constrained paths between nodes of type C (cf. Definition 3.5)
and constrained inverse paths between nodes of type C (cf. Defi-
nition 3.5) are characterised by types of the form (−→CC)∗ and (←−CC)∗
respectively. This characterisation is useful to compute the autho-
risation and prohibition relations associated with a graph G. As
usual, a∗ denotes a sequence of the form a,a, . . . ,a︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
, with n ≥ 0, so,
for example, a path of type (−→CC)∗ represents a chain of categories
in the ⊆ relation.
Note that an edgemay have type−→CC and also←−CC : if le(e).target =
{vi ,vi+1} then the edge can be traversed in both directions and has
both types. In fact, a chain of equivalent categories is represented
by a path v0,v1, . . . ,vn of both types (−→CC)∗ and (←−CC)∗, instead of
using a cycle v0,v1, . . . ,vn ,v0 of type (−→CC)∗— our goal is to avoid
redundant edges.
Definition 3.8 (Redundant edges). Redundant edges of type DIC
(i.e., DUC or DSC), SC , CC and CA are defined as follows:
• An edge of type DIC , between nodes representing a data
item di and a category c , is redundant if there is a path of
length n ≥ 2 and type DIC, (−→CC)∗ connecting di and c in the
graph.
• An edge of type SC , between nodes representing a service
s and a category c is redundant if there is a path of length
n ≥ 2 and type SC, (−→CC)∗ connecting s and c in the graph.
• An edge of type −→CC , between nodes representing two cate-
gories c1 and c2 is redundant if there is a path of length n ≥ 2
and type (−→CC)∗ connecting c1 and c2 in the graph.
• An edge of type CA between nodes representing a category
c and an action a is redundant if there is a path of length
n ≥ 2 and type (−→CC)∗CA connecting c and a in the graph.
The definition of redundant edges takes into account the fact that
lower categories inherit actions from higher categories, therefore
there is no need to connect actions to lower categories, if there
is already a connection through a higher category. In the case of
edges of type −→CC , transitive edges are redundant.
Prohibitions. In order to deal with prohibited actions, we consider
an extra field auth on labels of edges of typeCA andAC , with values
in {A,B}, to represent authorised and banned actions. By annotating
edge types CA and AC with the possible values {A,B}, we get
edges of typeCAA and ACA (solid edge) andCAB and ACB (dotted
edge), representing authorisations and prohibitions, respectively.
For example, in the policy graphG shown in Fig. 6, the edge between
the category "Modified Footage" and the action "Transfer" is dotted,
indicating that this action is not authorised for data items in the
category "Modified Footage", i.e., data emanating from the security
presence detector should not be trimmed and transferred to the
insurance company.
Note that, as before, we can define redundant edges of type CA
(see Definition 3.8), but now we need to consider separately the
edges of type CAA and CAB : an edge of type CAA connecting a
category c with an action a is redundant if there is already a path of
type (−→CC)∗CAA connecting c and a (this is because lower categories
inherit permissions from higher categories); an edge of typeCAB is
redundant if there is another path of type (←−CC)∗CAB connecting the
same nodes. This is because higher categories inherit prohibitions
from lower categories, so there is no need to add the edge of type
CAB from a higher category to an action if a lower category is
already connected to this action.
Definition 3.9 (Authorisation Path). An authorisation path in
CBDA consists of three sub-paths: a data path, a sharing path
and a service path. In each subpath, the edges of type CA must
be authorisation edges, i.e., CAA.
• The data path is a constrained path of type
DDU ,DUCDU , (
−−−−−−−→
CDUCDU )∗,CDU ACD ,ACDCDS ,CDSDS .
• The sharing path is a constrained path of type
DSCDS , (
−−−−−−−→
CDSCDS )∗.
• The service path is a constrained inverse path of type
CDSA
C
S ,A
C
SCS , (
←−−−
CSCS )∗,CSS .
According to the definition, the data path starts in a node of
type D (data source), which is followed by a node of type DU
(unprocessed data), one or more unprocessed-data categories nodes
of type CDU and a data collection action node of type ACD , ending
in a stored data node of type DS . Recall that in a constrained path,
edges of typeCC are traversed towards the target. The sharing path
starts in the end node of the data path, which is followed by CDS
nodes. The service path starts in the end node of the sharing path,
which is followed by a service action node of type ACS and one or
more service category nodes of type CS , ending in a service node
of type S .
Example 3.10. Fig. 4 depicts an authorisation path that starts
with a data path (from D toUD,UDC1,UDC2, DA, DSC1 and SD),
then continues with a sharing path (SD toDSC1 toDSC2), and ends
with a service path that ends in a node of type S . Note that in the
service path, the edges of type CC are traversed from a higher to a
lower category (←−CC), so this is a constrained inverse path.
Definition 3.11 (Prohibition Path). A prohibition path in CBDA
consists of three sub-paths: data path, sharing path and service
path; however, unlike authorisation paths, the edges of type CA
must be prohibition edges (i.e.,CAB ) and the data and sharing paths
must be constrained inverse paths whereas the service path must
be a constrained path. More precisely,
• the data path is a constrained inverse path of type
DDU ,DUCDU , (
←−−−−−−−
CDUCDU )∗,CDU ACD ,ACDCDS ,CDSDS .
• The sharing path is a constrained inverse path of type
DSCDS , (
←−−−−−−−
CDSCDS )∗.
• The service path is a constrained path of type
CDSA
C
S ,A
C
SCS , (
−−−→
CSCS )∗,CSS .
According to the definition, the data path is a constrained inverse
path (i.e., edges of type CC connecting two categories c1 and c2
where c1 ⊆ c2 are traversed from c2 to c1), which starts in a device
D and ends in a stored data item node DS . The sharing path is a
constrained inverse path between CDS nodes starting in the end
node of the data path. The service path is a constrained path starting
in the end node of the sharing path and ending in a service node S .
Example 3.12. Fig. 5 depicts a prohibition path, starting with a
data path and ending with a service path.
We now characterise policy graphs that correspond to CBDA
policies, that is, graphs where there is at most one node representing
each entity, edge types correspond to classes of entities linked by
CBDA relationships, there are no authorised and forbidden actions
for the same entities, and there are no redundant edges.
Definition 3.13 (Well-formed Graph). A policy graph (V ,E, lv, le)
is a well-formed if it satisfies the following constraints:
(1) For every v1,v2 ∈ V , if lv(v1).ent = lv(v2).ent and
lv(v1).type = lv(v2).type then v1 = v2.
(2) Every e ∈ E, where le(e).adj = {v1,v2}, satisfies one of the
following conditions:
(a) lv(v1).type = D ∧ lv(v2).type = DU . This corresponds to an
edge of type DDU , which connects a device and an unpro-
cessed data item. Exactly one edge of type DDU exists for
each node of type DU .
(b) lv(v1).type = DU ∧ lv(v2).type = CDU . This corresponds
to an edge of type DUCDU , which connects an unprocessed
data item to an unprocessed data category.
(c) lv(v1).type = CDU ∧ lv(v2).type = ACD ∧ CDU ∈ C. This
corresponds to an edge e of typeCDU ACD , which connects an
unprocessed data category to a data collection action, and in
this case le(e).auth must be defined, such that le(e).auth ∈
{A,B}.
(d) lv(v1).type = ACD ∧ lv(v2).type = CDS ∧ CDS ∈ C. This
corresponds to an edge of typeACDCDS , which connects a data
collection action and a data sharing category, and in this case
le(e).auth must be defined, such that le(e).auth ∈ {A,B}.
(e) lv(v1).type = DS ∧ lv(v2).type = CDS . This corresponds to
an edge of type DSCDS , which connects a stored data item
to a data sharing category.
(f) lv(v1).type = CDS ∧ lv(v2).type = ACS ∧ CDS ∈ C. This
corresponds to an edge e of type CDSACS , which connects a
data sharing category to a service action, and in this case
le(e).auth must be defined, such that le(e).auth ∈ {A,B}.
(g) lv(v1).type = ACS ∧ lv(v2).type = CS ∧ CS ∈ C. This corre-
sponds to an edge e of type ACSCS , which connects a service
action to a service category, and in this case le(e).auth must
be defined, such that le(e).auth ∈ {A,B}.
(h) lv(v1).type = CS ∧ lv(v2).type = S . This corresponds to an
edge of type CSS , which connects a service category and a
service.
(i) lv(v1).type = C ∧ lv(v2).type = C ∧ le(e).target ⊆ {v1,v2},
where both types are CDU or both CDS or both CS . This
corresponds to an edge between categories of unprocessed
data, categories of stored data, or categories of services.
Moreover, for every e1, e2 ∈ E, if le(e1).adj = le(e2).adj =
{v1,v2}, then either e1 = e2 or e1, e2 have type CA
and le(e1).auth , le(e2).auth.
(3) If a constrained path and an inverse constrained path start in
the same node ud of type DU (resp. sd of type DS , s of type S)
and end in nodes of type ACD or A
C
S , such that the last edges
in the paths are of type CAA, CAB respectively, then the end
nodes must be different.
(4) There are no redundant edges.
Given a policy graph G, the CBDA relations can be defined in
terms of typed paths.
Definition 3.14 (Relations). Let G be a well-formed policy graph.
The following relations are derived from G:
• DUAG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent) | type(v1,v2) = DDU }.
• DICAG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent) | type(v1,v2) = DIC}.
This relation consists of two parts:
DICAUG contains pairs where type(v1,v2) = DUCDU .
DICASG contains pairs where type(v1,v2) = DSCDS .
• ACAG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent, lv(v3).ent) |
type(v1,v2,v3) = AC,CC}. This relation consists of two parts:
ACADG , where type(v1,v2,v3) = ACDCDU ,CDUCDS .
ACASG where type(v1,v2,v3) = ACSCDS ,CDSCS .• BACAG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent, lv(v3).ent) |
type(v1,v2,v3) = AC,CC}. This relation consists of two parts:
BACADG where type(v1,v2,v3) = ACDCDU ,CDUCDS .
BACASG where type(v1,v2,v3) = ACSCDS ,CDSCS .• SCAG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent) | type(v1,v2) = SCS }.
• ADG = {(lv(v3).ent, lv(v1).ent, lv(v5).ent) | ∃v0,∃v21, . . . ,v2n
s.t. (v0,v1,v21, . . . ,v2n ,v3,v4,v5) is an authorisation data path
and (lv(v3).ent, lv(v1).ent, lv(v5).ent) ∈ OPd }.
• BADG = {(lv(v3).ent, lv(v1).ent, lv(v5).ent) |
∃v0,∃v21, . . . ,v2n s.t. (v0,v1,v21, . . . ,v2n ,v3,v4,v5) is a prohi-
bition data path and (lv(v3).ent, lv(v1).ent, lv(v5).ent) ∈ OPd }.
• ADSG = {(lv(v3).ent, lv(v1).ent, lv(v5).ent) | ∃v21, . . . ,v2n ,
v41, . . . ,v4n s .t .(v1,v21, . . . ,v2n ,v3,v41, . . . ,v4n ,v5) is an autho-
risation sharing and service path}.
• BADSG = {(lv(v3).ent, lv(v1).ent, lv(v5).ent) | ∃v21, . . . ,v2n ,
v41, . . . ,v4n s .t .(v1,v21, . . . ,v2n ,v3,v41, . . . ,v4n ,v5) is a prohi-
bition sharing and service path}.
• UNDETDG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent, lv(v3).ent), | lv(v1).type =
ACD , lv(v2).type = DU , lv(v3).type = DS } − (ADG ∪ BADG).• UNDETSG = {(lv(v1).ent, lv(v2).ent, lv(v3).ent), | lv(v1).type =
ACS , lv(v2).type = DS , lv(v3).type = S} − (ADSG ∪ BADSG).
The data access policy defined by the graph, denoted byCBDAG ,
is the tuple ⟨EG ,DUAG ,DICAG ,SCAG ,ACAG ,BACAG ,
ADG ,BADG ,ADSG ,BADSG ,UNDET G⟩where EG = (DG ,
DIG ,AG ,CG ,SG , ⊆) consists of the sets of data sources, data
items, actions, categories, services, and the hierarchical relation ⊆
obtained by computing paths of type CC∗ as indicated in Defini-
tion 3.6. For example, DG = {lv(v).ent | lv(v).type = D,v ∈ V }.
The other sets in EG are computed similarly.
Example 3.15 (Policy Graph). Fig. 6 shows a CBDA policy graph
for a smart home; full edges have type CAA and dotted edges have
type CAB . Different node types are depicted using different pat-
terns. For example, the black node labelled Security Presence De-
tector has type D (device); the node Security Footage has type DU
(unprocessed data); the nodes Restricted and Protected represent
categories and have typeCDU ; Live Stream and Trim have typeACD
(data collection actions); Live footage and Trimmed file have type
DS (stored data); Streamed Footage, Trimmed Footage andModified
Footage have type CDS (they represent data-sharing categories);
Live Watch, View File, Share, Sell, Market and Transfer have type
AS (service actions), the nodes House Owner, Security, Health
and Insurance are service categories and have type CS ; and Louis,
Metropolitan Police and Royal Oak have type S (services).
Two authorisation paths are highlighted in boldface in Fig. 6. The
top one connects the nodes Security Presence Detector and Security
Footage with an edge of type DDU , then continues with an edge
of type DUCDU (from Security Footage to the node representing
the Restricted category), followed by an edge of typeCDUCDU (be-
tween the Restricted and Protected categories), CDU ACD (between
the Protected category and the action Trim), ACDCDS (between
the action Trim and Trimmed Footage category), CDSACS (between
Trimmed Footage and the service action View File),ACSCS (between
the View File and the service category Security), andCSS (between
the Security category and the service Metropolitan Police).
The graph also shows that the Security Footage from Security
Presence Detector is stored as Streamed Footage and will be live
watched by the House Owner (authorised action) but will not be
transferred to the Insurance service as it is in the Modified Footage
category (prohibited action), shown by a dotted edge of type CAB .
There are also prohibition paths for data generated by the smart
meter in Fig. 6: the banned edge connecting the category Confiden-
tial and action Upload indicates that the electricity consumption
data cannot be uploaded as raw data. If instead we had a full edge
between the Confidential category and the action Upload, the raw
data could be stored as Raw Consumption but the dotted edge be-
tween the data sharing category Raw Utilities and service action
View Raw Data means that neither the smart meter supplier nor
the house owner is able to view the raw electricity consumption.
Replacing the dotted edge (CAB ) between Raw Utilities and View
Raw Data with a full edge (CAA) would permit the House Owner
to see the Raw Consumption data, but not the Smart Meter Supplier
(dotted edge between View Raw Data and Smart Meter Supplier).
Proposition 3.16. Let G be a well-formed policy graph. Then the
tuple CBDAG is a CBDA policy.
Proof. The relations derived from the graph satisfy the axioms
(da1)-(da8): The definition of authorisation and prohibition paths
reflects axioms (da1), (da2), (da5) and (da6); axioms (da4) and (da8)
are satisfied by definition of well-formed graph; and axioms (da3)
and (da7) are satisfied by definition of UNDETDG and UNDETSG .
□
Figure 6: CBDA Policy Graph
Proposition 3.17. Let P be a CBDA policy. There exists a well-
formed policy graph G that represents the policy P.
Proof. The set of nodes in G is determined by the set E of
entities in the CBDA policy, and similarly, relations in the policy
directly map to edges in the graph. The only difficulty is the repre-
sentation of actions, where we need to establish the set of categories
to which they apply and identify actions that have the same name
and apply to the same categories (since a well formed graph cannot
have multiple nodes of the same name and type). □
4 POLICY ANALYSIS
Meta-data queries, policy content queries, and policy effect queries
are traditionally used to analyse policies [5]. This paper focuses on
policy content and policy effect queries. The first are used to exam-
ine the content of policies, and the latter to check the authorisations
and prohibitions specified by the policy.
4.1 Policy content queries
The following are typical queries about policy components (we
describe some distinctive cases, others are treated similarly and
omitted due to lack of space).
Q1: Are all the data items associated with at least one category?
E.g., are all the unprocessed data items associated with at least
one unprocessed data category and are all the stored data items
associated with at least one data sharing category?
Q2: Are there (permitted or prohibited) actions available for
each category (e.g., data collection actions for unprocessed data
categories and data sharing categories, service actions for data
sharing categories and service categories)? And more precisely,
which actions are associated with each category?
Q3: For a given category, what are the associated data? E.g.,
which unprocessed data belong to a given unprocessed data cate-
gory and which stored data are in a given data sharing category?
Q4: For a given data item, what actions are permitted? E.g. what
data collection actions are permitted for an unprocessed data item?
What service actions are permitted for a given stored data item?
Graph-theoreticmethods answer all the queriesmentioned above
when using graph policies as follows:
Q1. All the data items are associated with at least one category
if and only if the degree of every node of type DU is greater than 1
and the degree of every node of type DS is greater than 0. This is
because Def. 3.13 specifies that there is one edge of type DDU for
each node of typeDU , and nodes of typeCDS can only be connected
to nodes of type DS .
Q2. All the categories have some associated (permitted or pro-
hibited) actions if and only if
(1) for each node v of type CDU there is a path of type
(−−−−−−−→CDUCDU )∗,CDU ACD
A or a path of type (←−−−−−−−CDUCDU )∗,CDU ACD
B
starting in v .
(2) for each node v of type CDS there is a path of type
ACDC
A
DS
, (−−−−−−−→CDSCDS )∗ or a path of type ACDCBDS , (
←−−−−−−−
CDSCDS )∗ end-
ing in v , as well as a path of type (−−−−−−−→CDSCDS )∗,CDSACS
A or a
path of type (←−−−−−−−CDSCDS )∗,CDSACS
B starting in v .
(3) for each nodev of typeCS there is a path of typeACSCS
A, (−−−→CSCS )∗
or a path of type ACSCS
B , (←−−−CSCS )∗ ending in v .
Q3. To retrieve the set of data items that belong to a category
udc ∈ CDU or dsc ∈ CDS :
(1) compute the set {v1, . . . ,vn } of nodes of type DU such that for
each vi there is a path of type DUCDU , (
−−−−−−−→
CDUCDU )∗ starting
from vi and ending in the node of type CDU representing udc ,
and output lv(vi ).ent (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
(2) compute the set {v1, . . . ,vn } of nodes of type DS such that for
eachvi there is a path of typeDSCDS , (
−−−−−−−→
CDSCDS )∗ starting from
vi and ending in the node of type CDS representing dsc , and
output lv(vi ).ent (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Q4. To obtain the set of permitted actions on a given data item
represented by a node v of type DI , we distinguish two cases:
(1) If v of type DU (unprocessed data item), permitted data collec-
tion actions are obtained by computing all the paths of type
DUCDU , (
−−−−−−−→
CDUCDU )∗,CDU ACD
A starting at v .
(2) If v of type DS (stored data item), permitted data collection
actions are obtained by computing all the paths of type
ACDC
A
DS
, (−−−−−−−→CDSCDS )∗,CDSDS ending at v; and permitted ser-
vice actions are obtained by computing all the paths of type
DSCDS , (
−−−−−−−→
CDSCDS )∗,CDSACS
A starting at v .
The complexity associated to each query is polynomial on the
size of the policy (more precisely, on the size of the traversed sub-
graph).
4.2 Policy effect queries
In this section we discuss three policy-effect queries: totality, consis-
tency and absence of conflict. Totality guarantees the policy covers
all relevant actions and services for each data item, consistency
guarantees no authorisation/prohibition clashes arise from the pol-
icy, absence of conflict deals with mutually exclusive actions. We
show how to check these properties in general, independently of
the categorisation methods used in the CBDA policy.
Definition 4.1 (Totality). A CBDA policy is total if it specifies all
authorised and banned actions associated with each service s for
every data source d generating data items di .
Definition 4.2 (Consistency). A CBDA policy is consistent if it
defines non-contradictory options for any given data item di , i.e.,
all relevant actions are either permitted or prohibited, but not both.
Assuming there is a well-formed policy graph G representing
the CBDA policy, totality can be verified by computing the relations
ADG , BADG , ADSG and BADSG :
Proposition 4.3 (Totality). A CBDA policy defined by a policy
graph G is total if and only if
(1) for all nodesud of typeDU , da of typeACD and sd of typeDS such
that (ud,da, sd) ∈ Opd , (da,ud, sd) ∈ ADG ∪ BADG ; and
(2) for all nodes sd of type DS and s of type S such that sa applies to
sd , (sa, sd, s) ∈ ADSG ∪ BADSG .
Consistency is enforced by axioms (da4) and (da8), that is, the
policy graph satisfiesADG∩BADG = ∅ andADSG∩BADSG =
∅, which means that data access policies defined by well formed
graphs are consistent by construction.
Absence of conflict means that two mutually exclusive actions
on the same data item are not permitted. If an action da1 ∈ ACD
that produces a stored data item sd1 ∈ DS from an unprocessed
data item ud ∈ DU is in conflict with an action da2 ∈ ACD then the
policy should ensure that if da1 is authorised then da2 is forbidden
and vice versa. Similarly, if an action sa1 ∈ ACS performed by a
service s1 on a stored data item sd ∈ DS is in conflict with an action
sa2 ∈ ACS performed by s2 then the policy should ensure that if
sa1 is authorised then sa2 is forbidden and vice versa. This kind of
checks can be done by computing paths:
Proposition 4.4 (Absence of Conflict). Let G be a well-formed
policy graph. Assume two actions da1,da2 of type ACD (resp. two
actions sa1, sa2 of type ACS ) are mutually exclusive.
The policy graph G ensures absence of conflict between da1 and
da2 if for each node ud of type DU , the set of authorisation paths that
start in ud does not contain paths via da1 and paths via da2
The policy graph G ensures absence of conflict between sa1 and
sa2 if for each node sd of type DS , the set of authorisation paths that
start in sd does not contain paths via sa1 and paths via sa2
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we discuss techniques to implement DataBank’s
repositories. For users with technical resources to manage local
storage (e.g., companies that need to protect their data) the Data
Pocket is implemented locally. For non-technical users, we propose
a solution that does not require installing purpose-built hardware or
building a local control hub. Specifically, we propose to implement
both the Data Pocket and central repository in the cloud using a
novel encryption technique (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2) that ensures
that data is kept secure and can only be accessed with owner’s
authorisation. Having the data pocket in the cloud means that users
must upload data to the cloud, even if they do not want to share it
at all, but the risks are balanced by the benefits of not having to buy
any additional components to implement their own secure storage.
5.1 Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE)
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) is a type of Public Key Encryption (PKE)
which transforms the ciphertexts under the public key of Alice into
ciphertexts decryptable by Bob [18]. It uses a proxy which has a
re-encryption key which in conjunction with the ciphertext can
modify it to make it decryptable by Bob. The proxy must be able to
do this while learning nothing about the underlying message which
is encrypted. A PRE environment has three actors [18]: Delegator
(delegates decryption rights using re-encryption, i.e., Alice), Delega-
tee (is granted the right to decrypt ciphertexts, i.e., Bob) and Proxy
(responsible for the re-encryption). In the re-encryption process,
the proxy transforms ciphertexts under the delegator’s public key
into ciphertexts that the delegatee can decrypt with his private key.
The simplest use case of a PRE scheme uses a PKE scheme: Alice
generates a message and encrypts it with her public key, later she
decides to share this with Bob and asks the proxy to re-encrypt it
with a re-encryption key. Bob can then retrieve the re-encrypted
ciphertext and decrypt it with his private key. Unlike PKE, PRE
allows Alice to encrypt the ciphertext without knowing she wanted
to share information with Bob. Alice could do this repeatedly for
multiple people without having to decrypt her data.
5.2 Umbral: A Threshold PRE Scheme
Umbral is a threshold Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme based on ellip-
tic curve cryptography, which delegates decryption rights using N
number of semi-trusted proxies [19]. It is a threshold scheme be-
cause it requires a minimum number of proxies to cooperate to per-
form re-encryption. Umbral improves upon the BBS98 Scheme [7]
by adding the properties of unidirectionality and non-interactivity.
It is a Hybrid Proxy Re-Encryption scheme using Symmetric Cryp-
tography to encrypt plaintext and Public Key Cryptography to
exchange the symmetric key. Re-encryption is achieved by the use
of a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). Umbral encrypts the
message with a symmetric key derived from Alice’s public key and
then generates a ciphertext alongside a capsule or KEM ciphertext.
This capsule “encapsulates" or “contains information critical to the
computation of the symmetric key". What is re-encrypted is not the
ciphertext but the capsule, which encapsulates the symmetric key,
thus re-encapsulating the key. The combination of the encapsula-
tion, decapsulation and re-encapsulation provides the functionality
of a Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme.
Unlike other PRE schemes, Umbral encrypts the plaintext with an
authenticated symmetric encryption algorithm (Chacha20-poly1305
in the PyUmbral implementation [19]). It then creates a capsule
that encapsulates the symmetric key. Then Alice generates re-
encryption key fragments which are distributed to semi-trusted
proxies. These proxies can then use the original capsule and the key
fragments to compute capsule fragments to be sent to Bob. These
capsule fragments alongside the ciphertext can be sent over non-
trusted environments. Bob can then fetch the capsule fragments.
Whenever he has a threshold number, he can decapsulate the cap-
sule with his private key. Now, Bob can compute the symmetric
key Alice used for encryption. Then he can decrypt the data.
The ciphertext is protected by standard symmetric encryption,
and the capsule is protected against forgery by the discrete loga-
rithm problem, allowing it to be safely sent across an unknown
network. Furthermore, for every re-encryption key, a shared se-
cret is generated between the delegate’s pair and a temporary pair.
This makes the scheme unidirectional as the same re-encryption
key cannot be used in the other direction. Moreover, given that it
uses the delegatee’s public key to create the re-encryption key the
scheme is non-interactive. It is also non-transitive and single use.
This scheme has the required properties for our application. The
use of Symmetric Cryptography in Umbral solves the efficiency
problem of PKE schemes in practical applications. Moreover, Um-
bral has extensive documentation and is fully implemented as a
cryptographic library with many helper methods. Note that the
number of cloud providers does not change the reliability of the
encryption. We only need one cloud provider to hold the cipher-
text for any number of receivers. The key issues are ensuring the
threshold number of proxies are available and ensuring they do not
collude. Ideally, proxies should be in a network of nodes with an
incentive not to collude; in our implementation this is achieved by
keeping the proxies within our domain.
5.3 Examples in Privasee
We discuss two scenarios to illustrate how users can specify data
collection restrictions, and how data is shared with services.
Example 5.1. To set up a policy, Privasee asks the user a small
number of privacy preferences, the data is then shared in accor-
dance with the policy. After signing in, the user selects the services
to share information with, data items and categories. For example in
Fig. 7a, the user is happy to share security footage from the security
presence detector for a year with the Security services with four
conditions: no sharing, no selling, no marketing (forbidden actions)
and only view the footage file in case of crime emergency (au-
thorised action). The corresponding authorisation and prohibition
paths are shown in Fig. 6 (with bold and dashed edges respectively).
In Fig. 7b, the metropolitan police (in the security category) requests
data from security presence detector for a day, the footage data is
automatically shared with this service according to the policy.
Example 5.2. If a user does not specify any data collection re-
strictions, the data is assigned by default to the Pocket data sharing
category, as shown in Fig. 6 (lower bold face path). Data in this cat-
egory is not shared: any access request by a service will be referred
to the user for a decision to be made. The user can create a policy
to specify authorisations (or prohibitions) for specific data items
and services, or leave the data in the Pocket category for future
review. When Royal Oak, an insurance company, requests to access
user’s NI number, post code, date of birth and smoking behaviour,
Privasee informs the user, who has to manually accept or reject
this request since no policy has been defined.
(a) User’s policy for security presence detector
(b) Data request for security presence detector
6 RELATEDWORK
Several approaches for cloud-IoT development combine layered
architectures with access control (e.g., using ACL and ABAC poli-
cies in [2]) but few focus on management of personal data. The
DataBank architecture [12] allows the user to control how data
is collected and how it is shared. Here we have proposed an inte-
grated data collection and access control model, CBDA, specifically
designed for privacy-preserving cloud-IoT architectures. It covers
the whole data cycle, from the point data is generated to the point
where it is used. Data collection and access control are modelled
separately in CBDA to ensure services never access raw data. Alter-
natively, the cloud could have been modelled as a service provider
(in its own category) but then we would need to allow this service
to access raw data. We followed the separation of concerns prin-
ciple, separating unprocessed and processed data categories, and
separating service providers from the cloud provider.
For the definition of policies we use the category-based ap-
proach [4], which is suitable for highly dynamic scenarios as re-
quired in cloud-IoT applications. A role is a particular case of cat-
egory, and categories can also be defined on the basis of user, ob-
ject or environment attributes, hence CBDA subsumes the popular
RBAC [21] and ABAC models [14, 16]. The graph-based policy rep-
resentations we define generalise previous approaches [3, 11] by
including data sharing categories as a mechanism to link data and
services.
Other cloud-IoT architectures have been proposed (see [1] for
an overview), and the data access model and implementation tech-
niques proposed in this paper could be adapted for them. Among
the approaches proposed to tackle privacy issues for personal data
in cloud-IoT platforms, two are close to ours: Haddadi et al. [15]
Databox, and Mun et al. [17] Personal Data Vault. However, these
approaches do not provide a language to visualise policies.
Databox [15] is a trusted platform enabling people to manage
personal data in a controlled way. Our work is complementary,
in that we propose an architecture with a mechanism for users
to specify data collection policies at device level as well as data
sharing policies for cloud-stored data.
Personal Data Vault [17] offers a secure, individual data repos-
itory to store personal data. Access Control Lists with specific
constraints (filters based on bound, precision and sampling fre-
quency) are used to control access to the data. Our proposal adds
control at the data-collection level, so users can select which data
is stored in the Vault. The category-based model generalises the
ACL-with-filters model proposed in [17].
7 CONCLUSION
We have presented a data model that integrates data collection and
data sharing features. The model is implemented in Privasee, a tool
based on the DataBank cloud-IoT architecture, which provides a
solution for individual users or companies to manage data in a
privacy-preserving way. Privasee suggests default privacy policies
by asking the user a small number of questions about their privacy
preferences. Data is kept secure in a repository where only the
user and authorised services can access it. We plan to improve
the usability and experimental evaluations of the system in future
work.
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